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COMMERCIAL PAPER AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
GEORGE W. STUMBERG*

Certificates of stock, bonds and other negotiable paper are apt to be
regarded by business men as the equivalents of tangibles and, so, are
normally dealt with by them as such. Nevertheless, stock certificates
and negotiable paper represent intangibles. A stock certificate, for
example, represents a share in the corporation. The owner of the share
has a number of inchoate claims which are not always susceptible of
exact delineation. Theoretically the owner is entitled to his proper
share of the balance remaining on hand after discharge of obligations
upon the dissolution of the corporation. He is also entitled to dividends;
if earned, and may, depending on the character of his stock, participate
in the selection of corporate directors. Bonds and other negotiable paper are likewise evidence of intangibles, namely, the primary or secondary obligations of those whose names are attached to the paper to
pay the amounts designated therein. Even a bill of lading or a warehouse receipt is not a full substitute for the tangible which it represents. It merely creates a duty on the part of a carrier or warehouseman
to deliver on presentment of the paper. If the paper is negotiable or
semi-negotiable the person to whom it has been issued may transfer
to another by some designated manner a similar right to delivery.
However, whatever wishful thinking there may be, the paper never
becomes the full equivalent of the goods deposited or shipped. At most
it creates a limited right to delivery. Its negotiability creates a power
to destroy by negotiation the claims of certain individuals to delivery
and to convey to another the right to possession. In the field of Conflict of Laws courts have tended, on the whole, to emphasize the thesis
that stock certificates and negotiable paper constitute no more than
evidence of intangibles and so have tended to deal with problems concerning them as problems concerning the intangibles which they represent. Except, perhaps, where the question has been one of an alleged
transfer of the obligations represented by the paper, the language used
by the courts has been similar to that employed by them when dealing
with ordinary contract problems. The differences of opinion as to the
proper law to govern the rights and duties of the parties have been
much the same.
* Professor of Law, University of Texas. Author, Principles of Conflict of
Laws (2d ed. 1951).
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SHARES OF STOCK

It is generally agreed that the rights of shareholders, insofar as
claims against the corporation are concerned, are controlled by the law
of the place of incorporation.1 Also, prior to the widespread enactment
in the United States of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, a majority of
the American courts took the position that the effect of a transfer of a
certificate of stock, to the extent that it affects ownership of the share,
is controlled by the same law. 2 The theory was that the laws of the
place of incorporation ultimately determine who is entitled to be recog3

nized as the owner of the share. In Masury v. Arkansas National Bank,

for example, a judicial seizure of the share in Arkansas, the state of
incorporation, took precedence over a prior pledge of the certificates,
the pledge not having been registered on the books of the corporation or
recorded in the Arkansas county where the corporation did business.
Again, in United Cigarette Machine Co. v. CanadianPacific R.R.,4 Canadian law was held to control the right of a transferee of a certificate
to be recognized as owner of a share in a Canadian corporation although the transfer took place in a jurisdiction where it was valid.
While there were decisions to the contrary, the prevailing thesis was
that just mentioned, that ownership of a share of stock depends ultimately on the laws in force at the place of incorporation. In addition,
for the garnishment of shares
statutes in the various states provided
5
of stock at the place of incorporation.
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act 6 was designed to bring about two
changes in the pre-existing order, (1) transfer of the share by transfer
of the certificate in the designated manner, and (2) attachment or
seizure of the certificate through judicial process in order to reach the
holder's interest in the share rather than by resort to garnishment of
the share at the place of incorporation. Upon first thought it might
seem that the effect of the Act is to bring about a merger of the share
with the certificate so that the certificate becomes the res in jurisdictions which have adopted the uniform legislation. This has not, however, been the position of the courts. A transfer of the certificate in a
1. Cf. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 288 U.S. 123, 53 Sup.

Ct. 295, 77 L. Ed. 652 (1933). See also Koster v. Lumbermens' Mutual Casualty
Co., 330 U.S. 518, 67 Sup. Ct. 828, 91 L. Ed. 1067 (1947).
2. See Note, 131 A.L.R. 192 (1941).
3. 87 Fed. 381 (E.D. Ark. 1898).
4. 12 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1926). During World Wars I and II, seizure of stock
owned by enemy aliens was upheld when the corporation was incorporated
in the United States. In addition, seizure of the certificate, as seizure of the
share, was upheld. Cf. Direction der Disconto-Geselschaft v. United States
Steel Corp., 267 U.S. 22, 45 Sup. Ct. 207, 69 L. Ed. 495 (1925).
5. See Notes, 87 A.L.R. 485 (1933), 122 A.L.R. 338 (1939).
6. For a general discussion of this Act, see Hine, Situs of Shares Issued
under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 799 (1939); Pomerance, The "Situs" of Stock, 17 CoRNELL L.Q. 43 (1931); Seymour, The Proposed Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 9 CALIF. L. REv. 186 (1921); 22 MAnQ. L.
REv. 209 (1938).
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jurisdiction which has adopted the uniform legislation. This has not,
however, been the position of the courts. A transfer of the certificate
in a jurisdiction which has adopted the Uniform Act undoubtedly comes
within it if the state of incorporation has also adopted the act. Here,
there is no difficulty since the law at the place of incorporation authorizes transfer of the share through transfer of the certificate, hence,
no barrier is raised under the law where the certificate is located and
where its transfer takes place. However, if the jurisdiction where the
corporate charter was granted has not adopted the Act, the effect of a
transfer of the certificate has been held not to be controlled by the law
of the place where it takes place even though the Uniform Act has been
adopted there.7
The theory has sometimes been that the power to transfer ownership
of the share through transfer of the certificate is ultimately controlled
by the law of the place of incorporation. Unless that law grants the
power, there can be no transfer of the share through transfer of the
certificate. At the same time it has been held that the power created
at the place of incorporation is operative abroad, where the certificate
is located, even though the law there has not been satisfied. In Morson
v. Second National Bank of Boston,8 for example, certificates of stock
of a Massachusetts corporation had been given the claimant in Italy.
The gift was consummated by endorsement and delivery but formalities required by Italian law to transfer by gift had not been complied
with. Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the gift on the ground that it was effective to transfer ownership
of the share under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act which had been
adopted in Massachusetts. Because of the universal adoption of the Act
in the United States, the matter is no longer important insofar as it
involves transfer in America of shares in corporations incorporated in
this country. The same is true of judicial seizure of the certificate, as'
well as seizure of the share at the instance of a creditor. It is, however,
important in connection with certificates which are located in this
country but which represent shares in corporations incorporated
abroad. Upon the theory that control of ownership of the share rests
finally with the country of incorporation, transfer of the certificate as
transfer of the share would logically, if the doctrine of the Morson case
is accepted, have to conform to the foreign law, the law of the place of
7. Presumably because of the universal adoption in the United States of the
Uniform Act, the problems from an interstate point of view are no longer
important except insofar as the earlier cases may have a bearing upon the
effect of transfer abroad of shares in American corporations or upon the effect
of a transfer in the United States of a share in a foreign corporation. See Note,
131 A.L.R. 192, 197 (1941). For a particular case, see Penington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 170, 156 Atl. 259 (1931), where the
transfer was one of a certificate representing a share of stock in a corporation incorporated in a state which had not adopted the Unifoilrh Act.
8. 306 Mass. 588, 29 N.E.2d 19 (1940).
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incorporation. Likewise, it would seem that the efficacy of attachment
or of levy upon the certificate as the equivalent of seizure of the share
would also depend on the law of the place of incorporation. Only if
that law authorizes transfer of the share or its seizure through transfer
or seizure of the certificate, would the transfer or seizure of the certificate affect title to the share. Instead of adopting the mercantile point
of view that the certificate is the res, the courts, perhaps logically
enough, have construed the Uniform Act as creating a power - one
which owes its existence to the law at the place of incorporation - to
transfer the share through transfer of the certificate in the manner permitted in the Act irrespective of where the certificate may be located.
Seemingly, if the Act or something similar to it has not been adopted
at the place of incorporation the transfer must comply with the law
there. But even though the position of the courts may be logical
enough, it would seem that better results might be attained, where the
matter is one of material effect on business transactions, through consideration of business convenience rather than through some judicial
hypothesis.
BILLS AND NOTES
Prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instrument Law the American cases involving questions of conflict of laws with respect to negotiable paper were numerous insofar as interstate problems were
concerned. 9 Naturally, because of the present degree of uniformity
brought about by the Uniform Act they are now of relatively exceptional occurrence. Local variations of the Act, because of occasional
local variations in wording or local interpretation, however, still give
rise to occasional controversies. Also, paper of foreign origin or
American paper which has circulated abroad gives rise to questions
whose solution is frequently difficult. The problems are complicated
by the fact that the number of names on the paper represent just so
many different undertakings. Drawer, acceptor and endorser, in the
case of bills of exchange, and maker and endorser, in the case of
promissory notes, enter into distinct obligations. Also, each endorsement, if effective, gives to the endorsee the right to payment or, in the
alternative, the power to transfer that right to his endorsee.
9. The Negotiable Instrument Law does not purport to deal with problems
of conflict of laws. On the continent of Europe movements in the direction
of uniformity resulted in the Geneva conventions in 1930, relating to bills
of exchange, and 1931, relating to checks. These conventions have been
widely adopted except by the Anglo-American countries. For general discussions see Balogh, Critical Remarks on the Law of Bills of Exchange of the
Geneva Convention, 9 TULANE L. REv. 165 (1935), 10 TuLuAN L. REv. 36 (1935);

Feller, The International Unification of Laws Concerning Checks, 45 HARV.

L. REV. 668 (1932); Hudson and Feller, The International Unification of Laws
Concerning Bills of Exchange, 44 HARv. L. REV. 333 (1931). For a critical
survey, see also Gutteridge, The Unification of the Rules Relating to Negotiable
Instruments, 16 J. ComP. LEG. & INT'L L. 53 (1934).

COMMERCIAL PAPER
A preliminary question may be the nature of the paper. Is it negotiable? If the'view in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws10 is accepted
and strictly applied the negotiable character of the paper as to the
drawer, acceptor or maker, as the case may be, would be determined
by the law of the place where the contract of each was technically
made since theoretically, and according to the Restatement, it is the law
of that place which determines the nature and validity of a contract.
Yet there are a large number of cases in which it has been held that
the law of the place of payment controls. In Sykes v. Citizens National
Bank," for example, a note had been executed in Kansas but was payable in Missouri. Prior to maturity it was transferred to the plaintiff.
The maker, having no notice of the transfer, paid the original payee.
He contended that the note was not negotiable; therefore, since he
had no notice of the assignment there was no obligation to pay the
plaintiff. The trial court found that according to Missouri law the note
was a negotiable instrument and gave judgment for the plaintiff. Its
holding was affirmed. By way of contrast a different result was reached
in Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.12 by the New York Court of Appeals. There a check was drawn at the instance of a dishonest clerk
in Illinois on a New York bank in favor of a nonexistent of fictitious
payee. The New York bank honored the check. The drawer contended
that the New York bank had made an unauthorized payment since under New York law the check was one without a payee and so created no
obligation to anyone. However, it was held that the "validity of a
check, the scope of the order to pay and the person authorized by the
drawer to receive payment are fixed at the inception of the instrument
and by the law of the place where the instrument had inception."
Since under Illinois law a check payable to a fictitious payee is payable to bearer, the bank was absolved.
The position has also been taken that the character of paper as to
the endorser 13 is controlled by the law of the place of endorsement
rather than by the law of the place where the instrument was originally executed and presumably was payable. The explanation here
may be an assumption that the endorser's undertaking is to pay, if the
principal obligor does not, at the place where the endorsement was
executed. As to him, under this assumption, the place of execution and
place of payment are theoretically identical. But an endorsement does
more than create obligations. If effective, it gives the endorsee the
right to payment.
In some continental countries the law differs radically from American law with respect to the ability of a thief to transfer, on a forged
10.

See RESTATEMENT,

CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§ 312-316, 320, 336 (1934).

11. 78 Kan. 688, 98 Pac. 206 (1908).12. 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E.2d 992 (1939).
13. Hyatt v. Bank of Kentucky, 71 Ky. 193 (1871).
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endorsement, title or right to payment. The matter has been litigated
from the point of view of conflict of laws in a number of English and
American cases. In the case of United States v. Guaranty Trust Company of New York, 14 for example, the United States Veterans' Bureau
drew a check on the Treasurer of the United States to the order of a
resident of Yugoslavia. The check never reached the payee but it was
paid by a bank in Zagreb to which it had been transferred under a
forged endorsement. The check was sent to a New York bank which
received payment from the United States. Having learned of the
forgery, the Treasurer of the United States later sued to recover the
proceeds of the check. The position of the Supreme Court was that
since the United States sent the check to Yugoslavia, it intended that
the check should be negotiated there, according to the law of that
country. Since the transfer there gave title to the Yugoslavian bank,
even though the endorsement was forged, the United States failed to
recover. By way of contrast in the case of Everett v. Vendryes 15 the
law of the place where the alleged transfer was made was held not to
be controlling. There a bill had been drawn in New Granada upon a
drawee in New York. It was endorsed to the plaintiff in New Granada.
Under the law there the endorsement, because of failure to observe
certain formalities, did not give the endorsee good title. Under New
York law, however, the endorsement transferred title. The paper was
dishonored by the drawee. Suit was against the drawer in New York.
The court assumed that the drawer's contract was to be performed in
New York (where the drawee was to accept) and applied the law of
that state. Again, in the case of Badger Machinery Co. v. United States
Bank and Trust Co.l6 the matter of innocent purchaser for value was
referred to the law of the place of execution which was also the place
of payment.
In England a distinction has been made between a foreign and an
inland bill. 17 The effectiveness of a transfer of the first is controlled by
the law of the place where it takes place but a transfer of an inland
bill is governed by English internal law. A further distinction has
been made by the New York Court of Appeals between an endorsement
to a bank for purposes of collection and one made for purposes of transfer of title.18 In the particular case a corporation had received a check
from the Treasury Department of the United States as payment for
a tax refund. The president of the corporation endorsed the check to
a Belgian bank. The amount of the check was collected through a New
14. 293 U.S. 340, 55 Sup. Ct. 221, 79 L. Ed. 415 (1934). See also Embiricos
v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, [1905] 1 K.B. 677; Koechlin v. Kestenbaum Bros.,
[1927) 1 K.B. 889.
15. 19 N.Y. 436 (1859).
16. 166 Wis. 18, 163 N.W. 188 (1917).
17. See The English Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 VICT. c. 61, § 72(2).
18. Weissman v. Banque de Bruxelles, 254 N.Y. 488, 173 N.E. 835 (1930).
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York bank and deposited to the personal account of the president who
withdrew the proceeds for his personal use. Under the law of Belgium
no liability by the bank to the corporation was created by the transaction. The law of New York and presumably that of the District of
Columbia imposed responsibility since the bank should have been put
on notice of the president's lack of authority. The court stated that if
the endorsement had transferred title to the Belgian bank, the law of
Belgium would have controlled. However, the position was that the
endorsement was for purposes of collection. Since the collection was
to be made in the United States the law here controlled as the law of
the place of performance.
While an endorsement normally amounts to a purported transfer of a
right to enforce the claim against the principal obligor for the amount
allegedly due, it also creates new obligations since the endorser impliedly agrees that if the principal obligor does not fulfil his obligations
the endorser will. Internal laws vary somewhat as to the steps which
must be taken by the holder in order to impose liability on the
endorser.
As has already been stated the position has been taken that with
respect to the endorser the character of the paper as negotiable is determined by reference to the law of the place of endorsement. Also,
the vast majority of Anglo-American courts have held that the steps
to be taken, such as notice, protest, and so forth, by the holder upon
default by the primary obligor are controlled by the law of the place
of endorsement. 19 The theory here sometimes is that the undertaking
of the endorser is to perform his secondary obligation at the place of
endorsement. So, place of performance and place of contracting are
theoretically the same. A similar position has been taken with respect
to the drawer of a bill.20 At the same time there seems to be substantial
agreement that it suffices if the form of the notice or protest conforms
to the law of the place where default by the principal obligor occurred.2 1 And, in a Missouri case, Belestin v. First NationalBank,22 the
19. See Amsinck v. Rogers, 189 N.Y. 252, 82 N.E. 134 (1907); Aymar v. Sheldon, 12 Wend. 439 (N.Y. 1834); Montana Coal and Coke Co. v. Cincinnati Coal
and Coke Co., 69 Ohio St. 351, 69 N.E. 613 (1904). As to necessity of previous
suit against the maker or acceptor, see Rose v. Park Bank, 20 Ind. 94 (1863);
Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33 (1860); Williams v. Wade, 42 Mass. (1 Metc.)
82 (1840). Or, as to the question of consideration, see Wood v. Gibbs, 35 Miss.
559 (1858). The amount of recovery as against the drawer or indorser has
been determined by the law applicable to their respective contracts. Slacum
v. Pomery, 6 Cranch 221 (U.S. 1810); Gibbs v. Fremont, 9 Exch. 25. Contra:
Bank of Illinois v. Brady, 3 McLean 268, 2 Fed. Cas. 649, No. 888 (N.D. Ill.
1843); Mullen v. Morris, 2 Pa. 85 (1845); Peck v. Mayo, 14 Vt. 33 (1842).
20. Cf. Amsinck v. Rogers, 189 N.Y. 252, 82 N.E. 134 (1907).
21. Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U.S. 546, 1 Sup. Ct. 418, 7 L. Ed. 254 (1883); Commercial Bank of Kentucky v. Barksdale, 36 Mo. 563 (1865); Sylvester v.
Crohan, 138 N.Y. 494, 34 N.E. 273 (1893); Douglas v. Bank of Commerce, 97
Tenn. 133, 36 S.W. 874 (1896); Carter v. Union Bank, 26 Tenn. 548 (1847).
Contra: Musson v. Lake, 4 How. 262, 11 L. Ed. 262 (U.S. 1846).
22. 177 Mo. App. 300, 164 S.W. 160 (1914).
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matter of adequacy of ultimate performance as to the drawer was held
to be controlled by the law of the place on which the paper was drawn.
There the plaintiff, in Missouri, bought a bill on a London bank from
the defendant bank. The bill was stolen but was paid in good faith by
the London bank although the endorsement had been forged. In absolving the defendant the Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that
the defendant's undertaking was that the bill would be paid according
to the law of the place of payment and, since under English law the
London bank was absolved, so would be the defendant Missouri bank.
It has been suggested that the actual decisions, when stripped of the
stated reasons through which their results were reached indicate a
strong overall tendency on the part of the courts to protect the holder
of paper.23 In so doing, so it has been said, they promote negotiability
as a mercantile device for the free exchange of credit. Actual results
reached in situations involving a contention of invalidity because of
usury undoubtedly support the suggestion since here the vast majority
of the courts have taken the position that the paper is nonusurious if
it can be upheld by reference to the law of either the place of making
or that of the place of payment. In some instances courts have even'
gone so far as to uphold the validity of the paper if the interest was
nonusurious under the law of any place with which it had a substantial
connection. 24 The reasons usually given in the usury cases are that the
parties are presumed to have intended a valid transaction. If that intention were not given effect the security of commercial transactions
would be undermined. In addition, two apparently conflicting decisions
by the Supreme Court of the United States might be offered as evidence to support the suggested tendency.2 In one an oral promise to
accept a bill was upheld because it was valid under the law of the place
where the promise was made; and in the other, involving the conflicting internal laws of the same two states it was upheld because it was
enforceable under the law of the place where the bill was to be accepted. Again, some of the decisions involving the incapacity of a
married woman under her domiciliary law to become surety for her
husband's obligations as, for example, where she is an endorser of his
paper, may indicate further an over-all desire to protect the holder 26
since here incapacity under the domiciliary law has usually been disregarded and at times the wife has been held responsible upon a theory
of a presumed intent to make a legally enforceable promise. Also it so
23. See Note, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1181 (1942).
24. See Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 47 Sup. Ct.
626, 71 L. Ed. 1123 (1927); Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa 194 (1867); Scott v.
Perlee, 39 Ohio St. 63 (1883); Dugan v. Lewis, 79 Tex. 246, 14 S.W. 1024 (1891).
25. See Hall v. Cordell, 142 U.S. 116, 12 Sup. Ct. 154, 35 L. Ed. 956 (1891);
Scudder v. Union National Bank of Chicago, 91 U.S. 406, 23 L. Ed. 245 (1875).
26. Cf. Greenlee v. Hardin, 157 Miss. 229, 127 So. 777 (1930). See also Poole
v. Perkins, 126 Va. 331, 101 S.E. 240 (1919).
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happens that in the cases in which endorsements abroad have been
held to be governed by foreign law as transfers of title, the results
have been protection of the holder.2 7 However, in these cases the
courts have tended to treat the paper as tangible property and as such
subject to the same rules of conflict of laws which control transfers
of movables in general.
In the main, any one of three types of questions may be presented
in cases involving negotiable paper: One, what are the obligations
of the parties to the paper to an acknowledged holder? Two, what is
the effect of an attempted transfer of the right to performance of the
collective obligations? Three, what steps must be taken by the holder
to impose liability upon the parties alleged to be responsible?
As to the first question, when the matter at hand has been one of
validity or invalidity, as where it is contended that the paper is
usurious, those courts which have given effect to the instrument if
they could possibly do so have taken as their primary consideration
security of commercial transactions, not some assumed underlying
a priori hypothesis. By way of contrast, when the question has been
one of the character or nature of the obligation supposedly created by
the agreements of the parties, they have divided along the traditional
lines to be found generally in the field of contracts and the conflict
of laws. The area of debate has been place of performance as against
place of making.
When the matter of negotiability is raised, it is normally assumed
that an obligation of some kind was created as the result of the original
transaction. The particular problem is the nature of the undertaking of
the alleged obligor which came into being when he put his name on
the paper. Is it the kind which is transferable by endorsement? Does
a transfer to an innocent person destroy defenses which could have
been set up against the payee? Does the transfer automatically impose
upon the obligor an obligation to pay the transferee? These questions
cannot be satisfactorily solved by a priori judicial assumptions or
hypotheses. They can only be solved by an over-all consideration of
business convenience. It may be that one who signs paper, as maker,
acceptor, or indorser, has no cause to complain if foreign law is held
to be controlling as to the nature of his undertaking, especially when
he knows, or should have known, that ultimate payment is to take
place abroad. To fix the character of the obligations of all the signers
of the paper by reference to the law of the place of performance of the
principal obligation would have the virtue of giving operative effect
to a single rule of law. Nevertheless, the obligor is less likely to be
familiar with the foreign rule than with his own. So, it seems somewhat unfair that his obligations be controlled by foreign law. It is be27. See note 14 supra.
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lieved that general convenience would be best served by giving effect
to the law of the place where the obligor assumes responsibility by
putting his name on the paper. On the other hand, the majority AngloAmerican decisions to the effect that necessity for protest and notice
is governed as to each secondary obligor by the law of the place of his
contract seem to place on the holder an undue burden since he must
ascertain the requirements in this respect under the law governing the
contract of any party to the paper he may wish to hold responsible
for the default of the principal obligor. It is generally agreed that the
form of the protest and notice in the case of a bill need only comply
with the law of the place where it is to be accepted or having been
accepted is to be paid. Ordinarily this would also be the place where
default occurs. The reason here seems to be that the holder cannot
conveniently make his protest in the form required under the law of
the place of the contract of each person secondarily responsible. Similar general considerations of business convenience seem to call also
for a rule by which necessity for protest and notice would be governed
by the law of the place where the paper is to be accepted or is to be paid,
which normally would be the place of default by the principal obligor.
Courts which take the position that the effect of an alleged transfer
of negotiable paper is governed by the law of the place where the
transfer is made are merely giving effect to the expectations of those
who engage in mercantile practices. Acceptance here of the business
point of view without regard to the subtle refinements usually encountered in the field of conflict of laws seems highly desirable, particularly if one keeps in mind that interstate and international trade
and commerce could not function efficiently without negotiable paper
as a tool for extension and transfer of credit.
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS AND BILLS OF LADING

The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, like the Uniform Stock Transfer Law, has been adopted throughout the United States. As enacted
in most states it provides for negotiability of the receipt when to
bearer or order. There are some slight differences in the wording, from
state to state, of some of the provisions of the law but in the main the
provisions as to negotiability and effect of negotiation are the same.
Consequently, interstate questions of conflict of laws are not likely to
arise. Also, ordinarily the receipt would be transferred in the jurisdiction where it was issued. In any event, the effectiveness of the law in
that place in providing for transfer of the receipt as a transfer of the
right to delivery of the goods would hardly be questioned. All of the
points of contact are the same. However, whether there has been negotiation and, if so, its effect as between the holder and the transferee
should, it is believed, be governed by the law of the place where the
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holder of the receipt allegedly negotiated it.
Unlike the case with the Uniform Stock Transfer Law and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the Uniform Bills of Lading Act has not
been widely adopted. However, since Congress has legislated with
respect to bills of lading covering shipments from one state to another
or from a state to a foreign country, local state law in this field is applicable only to intrastate shipment. Choice of law situations involving
them are not likely to arise. As is the case with respect to warehouse
receipts, all of the points of contact of the contract of carriage are in
the same state. The agreement is made there, delivery of the goods to
the carrier is to take place there, so that the agreement is to be wholly
performed there., Under any of the conflicting theories of conflict of
laws, negotiability of the bill of lading would be determined by reference to the law there. Furthermore, it is not likely that the bill of lading issued by the carrier will be transferred in a state other than the
one where the carriage is to take place. The area where choice of law
problems may arise as a practicable matter is that of bills of lading
covering shipments in foreign commerce. Unfortunately, their solution
is not simple, and the cases are relatively few.
The federal act does not apply to shipments from foreign countries
but it does to shipments from the United States in foreign commerce,
without regard to the flag of the carrier when the carriage is waterborne.2 8 There would seem to be no objection to applying American
28. See Bank of New York & Trust Co. v. Atterbury Bros., 226 App. Div. 117,

234 N.Y. Supp. 442 (1st Dep't. 1929); Archibald & Lewis Co. v. Banque Internationale de Commerce, 216 App. Div. 322, 214 N.Y. Supp. 366 (1st Dep't 1926).
Cf. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. State National Bank, 280 Ky. 444, 133 S.W.2d
511 (1939). The liabilities and immunities of carriers by sea in foreign commerce are now governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936, 49
STAT. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1300-1315 (1944). The statute is an implementation of the so-called Hague Rules of 1921. Insofar as carriage in foreign
commerce is concerned it replaces almost entirely the Harter Act of 1893, 27
STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 190-95 (1928). Insofar as carriage of goods by
water in domestic commerce is concerned, the Harter Act still controls unless
the Act of 1936 is incorporated into the bill of lading. The general scheme of the
Act of 1936 is to exempt the carrier from liability for losses resulting even from
negligence in management and navigation but to impose responsibility for
losses resulting from negligence in loading, stowage, care and delivery of the
cargo and for losses due to negligence in furnishing an unseaworthy vessel and
in not properly equipping and manning her. Furthermore, while the carrier
may by stipulation increase his responsibilities he may not diminish them.
The Act of 1936 is the culmination of a long struggle between shippers and
carriers who through stipulations in bills of lading attempted to throw the
risks of loss almost entirely on the shipper. The Harter Act was designed to
prohibit certain stipulations exempting carriers from liability. It applied to all
shipments to or from American ports. The Act of 1936 was, in effect, the readoption by the United States of the general principles of the Harter Act as
they had been accepted by the principal maritime nations at The Hague
Conference in 1921. These two acts (The Harter Act and the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act) do not purport to regulate negotiability and negotiation of
bills of lading. These matters are covered by the Act of August 29, 1916,
39 STAT.538-45 (1916), 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 81-124 (1951). The general scope of the
Act of 1916 is provided for in 39 STAT. 538 (1916), 49 U.S.C.A. § 81 (1951). As to
its application to a bill of lading issued in the United States by a French carrier
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law when the goods are received by a carrier and a bill of lading is
issued in this country insofar as the legal relations of the carrier and
the shipper are concerned. The points of contact are sufficiently numerous. If the thesis of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court with
respect to the effect of the Stock Transfer Act is accepted, 20 namely
that that act creates a power to transfer a right to be recognized as
owner of the share through the designated manner for transfer of the
certificate, logically the position could be with respect to bills of lading
that the federal law designates the manner by which transfer of the
bill of lading may operate as a transfer of the right to delivery of the
goods. This would result, of course, in the application of American law
without regard to the place of transfer of the bill.
The position might be taken in the alternative that transfer of a bill
of lading, irrespective of the place where it is issued or delivered, is the
exercise of a power relating to the transfer of an interest in a chattel.
Title interests in chattels are frequently said to be controlled by the
law of the situs.30 Therefore, it might be argued that the effectiveness
of a transfer of the bill of lading as a transfer of an interest in the
goods it covers should be controlled by the same law. 31 In the case of
Hallgarten v. Oldham, 2 Mr. Justice Holmes, while on the Massachusetts bench took the position that the effect of a transfer in New York
of a warehouse receipt, as to an attaching creditor, was controlled by
the law of the situs of the goods, which was Massachusetts. However,
the receipt was itself nonnegotiable. While an analogy to the situation
where a chattel is transferred was drawn 33 the further position was
that the same considerations might not be applied to an order receipt.
Later, in 1913, in Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown,34 involving an order
bill of lading situation, the Massachusetts court did, however, refer the
matter of the effect of an indorsement of a foreign bill of lading to the
law of the place where the bill was indorsed and delivered. The goods
had been shipped from Russia on a British vessel to the defendant in
Massachusetts. The defendant indorsed the bill to a hide company in
see Johnston v. Compaignie Generale Transatlantique, 123 Misc. 806, 206 N.Y.
Supp. 413 (Sup. Ct. 1924).

29. See Morson v. Second National Bank of Boston, 306 Mass. 588, 29 N.E.2d
19 (1940).
30. Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U.S. 664, 23 L. Ed. 1003
(1876); Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton, 48 N.J.L. 410 (1886). See also Beale, Jurisdiction over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel, 40 HARV. L. REv. 805 (1927);
Carnahan, Tangible Property and the Conflict of Laws, 2 U. oF Cnx. L. REV. 345
(1935); Stumberg, Chattel Security Transactions and the Conflict of Laws,
27 IowA L. REv. 528 (1942).
31. See Hellendall, The Res in Transitu and Similar Problems in the Conflict of Laws, 17 CAN. B. REV. 7 & 105 (1939).

32. 135 Mass. 1 (1883).

33. Mr. Justice Holmes referred to and quoted from Olivier v. Townes, 2
Mart. (n.s.) 93 (La. 1824), and Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139, 19 L. Ed.
109 (U.S. 1868). See also note 30 supra.
34. 214 Mass. 196, 100 N.E. 1025 (1913).
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Boston to be held in trust for the defendant. The hide company in
breach of trust delivered the bill for value to another concern which
sold it to the plaintiff. Under Massachusetts law the bona fide purchaser of a negotiable bill took title. Under English law, which the bill
of lading declared to be controlling as between owner and carrier, an
endorsement for a special purpose did not authorize the endorsee to
transfer title, or a right to delivery, to another. After declaring that
in any event the stipulation in the bill of lading referred only to claims
as between carrier and owner of the goods, the court decided that
Massachusetts law controlled so that as between the defendant and
the plaintiff the latter was entitled to delivery of the goods. It might
be added here that transactions involving bills of lading are frequently
accompanied by transactions involving letters of credit and drafts. As
has been seen, the effect of a transfer of negotiable paper is usually
held to be governed by the law of the place of negotiation. It would be
highly inconvenient therefore if the effect of a transfer of a bill of
lading were governed by a rule different from that applied to the transfer of an accompanying draft.
As has already been said,35 the federal act does not apply to foreign
bills of lading. A number of opposing ideas as to the proper law could
be urged, each supported with equal logic. It might be argued, for
example, that if the goods are consigned to a port in the United States,
the law of the state of delivery should determine negotiability upon
a theory that ultimate performance is to be consummated at the
place of delivery. 36 The carrier promises to deliver to the person
entitled to delivery there. The same position might be taken with
respect to a purported right to delivery by an assignee or transferee
of the bill. Again, the position might be that since the matter concerns
transfer of a title interest in goods, the law of the situs at the time
controls as to each transaction from the time of delivery by the shipper
to the time of delivery at destination. 37 This latter position would be
most inconvenient. Suppose, for example, that goods are delivered
to an English carrier at LeHavre, France, for delivery in the United
States. At this point not only the bill of lading as affecting the legal
relations between the carrier and the person to whom it is made out
would be controlled by French law but the same law would control
the effect of a transfer of the bill as a transfer of the right to delivery.
However, after the vessel reached the high seas, presumably English
law would control any transfer which might then be made as the law
of the flag. Then upon arrival in the United States the law of the
state where the goods then are would control.
35. See note 28 supra.
36. For an analogy in connection with negotiable paper, see Sykes v. Citizens
National Bank of Des Moines, 78 Kan. 688, 98 Pac. 206 (1908).
37. Hellendal, The Res in Transitu and Similar Problems in the Conflict of
Laws, 17 CAN. B. REV. 7 & 105 (1939).
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The Restatement of Conflict of Laws would resolve the matter by
ascertaining, first, whether under the law of the situs at the time a
document of title is issued the chattel becomes embodied in the document; then, if so, the law of the situs of the document would govern
the effect of its transfer as a transfer of a right to the chattel.38 It may
seem picayunish to quarrel with this point of view. So-called documents of title involve a number of legal relations. In the case of a
bill of lading and its transfer there is, first, the matter of the obligations
of the carrier, and then, second, the matter of the intermediate rights
and duties of the parties to the transfer and the rights as against the
carrier. The power to transfer a right to delivery as against others
through transfer of the bill is only one of the incidents of transactions
with respect to bills of lading. These transactions are peculiarly
transactions engaged in by business men. It is believed that their legal
effect should be such as to fulfill the reasonable expectations of those
who engage in them. It is further believed that these expectations can
be best fulfilled in connection with interstate and international affairs
by referring the matter of the over-all effect of each transaction to the
law of the place where it occurred rather than by resort to fine tech9
nicalities as to where the transfer may have been consummated. The
38. See RESTATEMENT, CONFI.CT OF LAWS §§ 50, 261 (1934).

39. The courts in only a few of the cases involving foreign-issued bills of
lading discuss the matter of the proper law to control negotiability and negotiation. In Olivier Straw Goods Corp. v. Osaka Shosen Kaisha, 27 F.2d 129 (2d
Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 618, 49 Sup. Ct. 22, 73 L. Ed. 540 (1928), for
example, the bill of lading purportedly covered a shipment on a Japanese vessel
from a Japanese port to an American port. The bill of lading with a draft
attached was sent to an American bank which paid the draft. In fact, the
goods had not been shipped. Suit was brought against the Japanese steamship
line. In imposing liability, Judge Augustus Hand took the position that the
bill of lading falsely represented the fact of shipment. No reference was
made to Japanese law. The case was decided on general principles of AngloAmerican maritime law. Perhaps the court assumed that the Japanese law
was similar to Anglo-American law. Cf. Archibald & Lewis Co. v. Banque
Internationale de Commerce, 215 App. Div. 562, 214 N.Y. Supp. 366 (1st Dep't
1926), in which a fraudulent bill of lading was apparently drawn in Bulgaria
and sent to a Paris bank with a draft attached. The Paris bank sent the
bill and the draft to New York for collection. The draft was paid. In a
suit against the Paris bank, the argument was that the federal act does
not apply to bills of lading issued abroad. The court then imposed liability
upon the Paris bank on the theory of false representation as to the validity
of the bill. A further position was that the indorsement of the bill of lading
by the French bank was for purposes of collection of the proceeds of the
accompanying draft. Since the indorsement was not a transfer of title, New
York law, as the law of the place of performance of the collection agency,
was held to control. In the case of Neumann v. Reiss, 138 Misc. 576, 245 N.Y.
Supp. 464 (Sup. Ct. 1930), goods had been shipped from Hamburg to New
York on a Japanese vessel. A German bank had sent the bill of lading with
a draft attached to its corresponding New York bank for collection. This bank
refused to accept the bill and draft. The shipment was discharged from the
vessel by a stevedoring company. Subsequently the United States Collector
of Customs took control. The plaintiff, a creditor of the shipper, attached the
goods. It was contended that the attachment was invalid because of an outstanding bill of lading which had not been surrendered. The court's position
was that the goods in the hands of Collector of Customs were no longer in the
possession of the carrier. Therefore the attachment was upheld. It was stated,
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result reached would usually be the same as that which would be
reached under the Restatement but not always.
A few words concerning the provisions in the proposed Uniform
Commercial Code concerning conflict of laws should be added.4 0 One
provision 41 permits the parties to agree that the law of a particular
state or country shall govern their rights and duties if the transaction
bears a reasonable relationship to that state or country. To permit
the parties to select the governing law has met with considerable
opposition in this country. When carriage of goods at sea was largely
in foreign bottoms, particularly British, it was the usual practice to
stipulate in the bill of lading that the law of the flag controlled. Insofar as the matter of restricting the obligations of the carrier were
concerned, the Supreme Court of the United States under the federal
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction disregarded these provisions,
usually on grounds of public policy. 42 Selection by the parties of their
own governing law runs counter to the spirit of the Restatement of
43
Conflict of Laws as well as the results in a number of decided cases.
There should, however, be no objection. Normally the problems involved concern the nature of the paper or the effect of an alleged transfer of it. By designating in their instrument the governing law, the
however, that goods in the hands of a stevedoring company employed by
the ship owner are in the possession of the carrier. The intimation was that,
had the Collector of Customs not taken possession, the ability of the general

creditor to attach would have been controlled by local New York law rather
than by the federal act.
The case of Roland M. Baker Co. v Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N.E. 1025
(1913), is of course direct authority for the proposition that the effect of a
transfer of a bill of lading as a transfer of a right to the delivery of the goods
is controlled by the law of the place of transfer. Since the federal law does not
apply to bills of lading issued abroad the effect of negotiation of a foreignissued bill would seem to be controlled, when the transfer takes place in the
United States, by the internal law of the appropriate state. It might be added
here that Professor Williston has taken the position that the failure of Congress
to extend the federal act to foreign bills of lading may have been due to the
thesis that our law could not be made applicable to bills of lading issued abroad.
See 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1116 (Rev. ed. 1936). It is doubtful whether Congress felt any restraint on its power in this respect since formerly the Harter
Act and now the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, note 28 supra, apply to shipnients in foreign commerce whether to or from the United States. It may be,
however, that congressional self-denial may have been due to a thought that
the character of foreign paper should not be controlled by the law of the
United States.
40. See UNiom COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105 (Official Draft 1952).
41. Id. § 1-105 (6).
42. See Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S.
397, 9 Sup. Ct. 469, 32 L. Ed. 788 (1889). See also Oceanic S. N. Co. v. Corcoran,

9 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1925).
43. See Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R.I. 162, 192 Atl. 158
(1937); cf. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Film Classics, Inc., 156 F.2d 596 (2d
Cir. 1946). See also Note, Commercial Security and Uniformity through
Express Stipulations in Contracts as to Governing Law, 62 HAnv. L. REV. 647
(1949). For the English point of view, see Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus
Shipping Co., Ltd., [1939] A.C. 277 (P.C.). The general thesis of the Restatement is that parties may not choose the applicable law. Legal rules control
without regard to the wishes of individuals.
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parties give expression in advance to their expectations as to the
effect, the general nature, of their transaction. However, the dispositions in the Code which would apply in the absence of express agreement run counter to general theories of conflict of laws and, in addition, would frequently result in the application of general provisions
of the Code, where adopted, under circumstances that would not be
within the reasonable expectations of the parties. Indeed the alternatives for the application of the locally adopted Code are such that it
would be relatively rare that its provisions would not be applied at
the forum. For example, the provisions with respect to documents
of title (Article 7) apply when the contract is made, offered or accepted or the transaction occurs within the state; or, is to be performed or completed with the state, in whole or in part; or, relates to
or involves goods which are to be or are in fact delivered, shipped or
received in the state; or, involves a bill of lading, warehouse receipt or
other document of title which is to be or is in fact issued, delivered,
sent or received in the state. Provisions dealing with the applicability
of other portions of the Code when a matter of conflict of laws is involved are equally or almost equally broad.4 Those responsible for
the conflict of laws provisions of the Code rely on Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 45 a usury case, in which Mr. Justice Stone
took the position that a contract will be upheld against a contention
of usury if the rate of interest conforms to either the law of the place
where the contract is made or is to be performed. As has been pointed
out earlier in this article the matter of legality or validity of the
instrument is not the same as that of its nature, as negotiable, for example, or of the transfer of the right to performance of the obligations
it creates. In the event that the Code is universally adopted in the
United States there will, of course, be few interstate problems of
conflict of laws. However, it is most unlikely that it will ever be
adopted abroad. The application of the Code to foreign transactions if
any of the designated contacts exist seems to hark back to a time
when one could suspect that courts were prone to apply, on whatever
excuse might occur to them, their own local law because it, the local
law, seemed to them necessarily to be superior. Of course, to pull
within the scope of the Code by resort to ten-gauge-shot-gun blasts
is likely to result in unexpected surprises to those who engage in
commercial transactions on an interstate or international plane.

44. As to commercial paper see UNIFOmV
ficial Draft 1952).

COMMERCIAL CODE §

45. 274 U.S. 403, 47 Sup. Ct. 626, 71 L. Ed. 1123 (1927).

1-105(3) (Of-

